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Using a very large sample of matched author-referee pairs, we examine how the gender of referees
and authors affects the former’s recommendations.  Relying on changing matches of authors and referees,
we find no evidence of gender differences among referees in charitableness toward authors; nor do
we find any effect of the interaction between the referees’ and authors’ gender.  With substantial research
showing gender differences in fairness, the results suggest that an ethos of objectivity can overcome













Discrimination is perhaps the most heavily researched topic in the field of labor 
economics and perhaps even among all endeavors in applied economics.  Much less work 
has been done on differences in fairness/charitableness by individuals with different 
characteristics, but that too is attracting increasing attention (e.g., Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, 2001, and the extensive summary by Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  Very little 
research has combined these two topics, asking whether the amount of 
favoritism/discrimination exhibited varies with the extent of the match between the 
parties (but see Parsons et al, 2011, Price and Wolfers, 2010, for differences by 
race/ethnicity, and Dillingham et al, 1994, for some sparse evidence on gender).   
Our purpose here is to combine these two questions, focusing on differences by 
gender.  In particular, we ask whether women are generally more or less generous than 
men in making up-or-down recommendations about others’ work, and whether their 
degree of generosity is affected by the gender of those whose output they are asked to 
judge.  While we despair of distinguishing favoritism toward one’s own group from 
discrimination against another, at least our results provide some evidence on whether the 
extent of favoritism/discrimination differs by gender of the favoring/discriminating party.   
Perhaps analogously to the theory of religious sects (Iannaccone, 1992), one 
might argue that the degree of solidarity within a group is a function of its relative size—
that smaller groups will be more cohesive and more likely to favor other members of the 
group. We test this possibility too here, examining whether women favor other women 
more when they account for a smaller share of the relevant population of those making 
the judgments or being judged.   2
II. Modeling Preferences and Favoritism 
  We seek to model interactions between members of two groups, with within-
group distinctions by gender.  Call the two groups that are involved authors and referees.  
Members of the two groups interact on what they perceive to be a one-to-one basis, with 
authors seeking a judgment of their work, referees either giving their approval or not.  
Denote authors as Ai (i = 1,…, I) and referees as Rj (j = 1,…, J).  Denote the gender of an 
author or referee by f(Ai) or f(Rj), equaling 1 for females and 0 for males.  The utility of 
referee Rj when matched with author Ai is: 
(1) U(Ai , Rj) = μi + ψj + αf(Ai) + βf(Rj)  + λf(Ai)f(Rj) + εij . 
The terms μi and ψj indicate the idiosyncratic values of author i’s work and referee j’s 
valuation of papers, respectively. Finally, there is some randomly distributed 
unobservable effect, εij , that results with each author-referee match.  
A paper is recommended for acceptance if: 
(2) U(Ai , Rj) > 0 , 
which occurs with probability: 
(3) Pr{μi + ψj + αf(Ai) + βf(Rj)  + λf(Ai)f(Rj) + εij > 0}. 
To understand the meaning of the parameters in (3), view the idiosyncratic μi and ψj as 
random draws, so that the composite error term is eij = μi + ψj + εij.  Letting G(.) denote 
the c.d.f. of -eij, the acceptance-recommendation probabilities of interest are: 
  Pr(accept | male referee, male author)        = G(0) 
  Pr(accept | male referee, female author)     = G(α) 
  Pr(accept | female referee, male author)     = G(β) 
  Pr(accept | female referee, female author)  = G(α+β+λ) .   3
Therefore, the effect of female authorship on a male referee’s acceptance probability is 
G(α)-G(0) and on a female referee’s acceptance probability is G(α+β+λ)-G(β).  The 
relevant “difference-in-difference” effect is then [G(α+β+λ)-G(β)]-[G(α)-G(0)].
1  T h i s  
difference-in-difference will be positive (negative) if female referees are comparatively 
more (less) generous than male referees when matched with female authors.   
  The formulation of utility in (1) implicitly assumes that the referees j can identify 
the gender of authors i.  If this were not so, then we would expect that λ ≡ 0, since, from 
the viewpoint of referees j, f(Ai) would be noise.  (Note that α could still be non-zero if 
paper quality differs by authors’ gender.)  Generalizing (1) and (3) to account for the 
possibility that in some cases the identity of authors is known, while in others it is not, we 
obtain: 
(3’) Pr{μi + ψj + αf(Ai) + βf(Rj) + λf(Ai)f(Rj)  
  +   α’Zijf(Ai) + β’Zijf(Rj)  + λ’Zijf(Ai)f(Rj) + εij  > 0}, 
as the expanded condition for the probability of recommending acceptance, where Zij is 
an indicator of whether f(Ai) is known to referee j.  With this expanded formulation, we 
would expect λ = 0 and would infer whether there is within-group favoritism from the 
difference-in-difference effect, which for Zij=1 (author gender observed) is 
[G(α+β+λ+α’+β’+λ’)-G(β+β’)]-[G(α+α’)-G(0)]. 
III. Matching Data to the Model 
  In order to estimate the parameters describing charity and favoritism, we need a 
panel of referees and authors that is sufficiently long that individual idiosyncrasies can be 
accounted for through multiple observations on the same referee matched to different 
                                                 
1Note that, unlike in the linear regression setting, the difference-in-difference is not given directly by the 
interaction-variable parameter λ.   See Ai and Norton (2003).   4
authors.  Referees should also be aware of the author’s gender, so that there is scope for 
them to indulge their preferences, if any, for their own gender.  Obviously, the latter 
problem does not arise in laboratory work—parties’ gender can, if the experimenter 
desires, be identified to others.  The former problem generally cannot, however, be 
handled extensively in what are typically very short-duration laboratory experiments. 
  Our data set contains all the submissions to a leading field journal that were sent 
out to referees between 1986 and early 2008.  The journal had a strict policy of double-
blind refereeing, so that it took some effort for referees to discover whether they matched 
the author’s gender.  We cannot know whether or not they discovered that a match did or 
did not exist—whether Z=1 or 0.  Evidence from another journal (Blank, 1991), however, 
suggests that even in the late 1980s referees could identify authors of half the papers they 
were assigned. This fact suggests that Z = 1 for many of these assignments.  
In case the ease of identifying authors has changed, we need a proxy for Z that 
might indicate whether it was possible for the referee to make this discovery.  Today it is 
trivial to discover the identity of the authors of most unpublished scholarly papers by 
doing an internet-based search for the paper’s title.  Such internet discovery was 
presumably far less prevalent during the early part of our sample.
2  We thus proxy Z by 
dividing the sample period into three parts:  1986-1994, when author gender could not be 
identified via the internet (but perhaps could be through working paper series, direct 
knowledge of the paper, etc.); 2000-2008, when authors’ gender could be identified 
easily via the internet; and 1995-1999, when the degree of identifiability via the internet 
                                                 
2Whereas 45 percent of American adults in 2000 had reported using the internet in the previous month, 
only 9 percent had reported doing so in 1996 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years).  The 
internet-usage statistic is not available before 1996, but would no doubt indicate lower usage percentages. 
   5
may have been unclear.  In most of our comparisons and estimation, we drop matches 
from this middle period.
3  To the extent that authors’ gender is more likely to be known 
to the referee (Z=1) in the late period (2000-2008) than in the early period (1986-1994), 
our ability to detect statistically a gender-matching effect would be greater in the late 
period. 
2940 initial submissions were sent to at least one referee.  In the early period not 
all authors’ names were listed in the data file, so that, as Table 1 shows, for only 70 
percent of the papers were all the authors identifiable.  In the later period the records 
were nearer to being complete. Authors’ gender was completely identifiable on 80 
percent of the manuscripts, with our inability to identify authors’ gender due mostly to 
ambiguity about the gender identification of various given names.  Around one-sixth of 
the papers for which the gender of all authors could be identified had only female 
authors, and one-third had at least one female.  Both fractions increased between the early 
and late periods, significantly so for the “any female” category.  Because of differences in 
both levels and changes of the “all female” and “any female” classifications, our analysis 
considers both classifications as indicators of female authorship (f(Ai)=1). 
The journal used 6165 referees to judge these papers, but we were unable to 
identify the gender of 32 of them.  A total of 1514 different referees judged papers during 
this time period. One instance of refereeing was most common, but 179 individuals 
judged at least ten manuscripts (and the busiest referee judged 36 papers).  Of the 
                                                 
3Dividing the entire period into two equal-length parts and replicating our analysis does not qualitatively 
change any of our conclusions.  Nor are our results altered qualitatively when we include all observations 
from 1986-2008 in the estimation.  
   6
identifiable referees, 19 percent were women, a percentage that increased significantly 
between the early and late periods, as Table 2 demonstrates. 
The identification strategy here relies on multiple matches between a referee and a 
variety of authors, and multiple matches of a particular article to referees.  It is thus 
identical to the strategy used to identify firm-worker match effects by Abowd et al (1999) 
and, in the context of discrimination, by Parsons et al (2011).  This approach is 
unaffected by the identity of the (very few) editors, so long as they do not assign referees 
to articles based on their belief that particular referees will or will not discriminate/show 
favoritism that depends on the gender of the authors. 
As Table 2 also shows, the matching of authors and referees was not random by 
gender over the entire period:  Female referees were more likely than male referees to be 
matched with papers that had any or all female authors.  This was not true during the 
early period.  The relatively few papers that had female authors were only slightly more 
likely than others to be assigned a female referee; but in the late period there was more 
gender matching, especially of papers on which all authors were women.  The difference 
in the extent of gender-matching with “all-female” and “any-female” papers may reflect 
the specialization of women in certain sub-fields.  Regardless, this phenomenon justifies 
accounting for this non-randomness in our estimation.  
Each referee was asked to rate the assigned paper on a four-point scale, with the 
possible ratings being:  accept; accept with minor changes; accept with major changes; 
reject.  As the first two columns of Table 3 indicate, referees recommend that roughly 
half of the papers be rejected.  A recommendation of outright acceptance is extremely 
rare—most positive recommendations involve the referee offering asking for major   7
changes in the manuscript.  The crucial thing to note in the table is the comparison by 
gender.  In the entire sample, and in each sub-period, there is absolutely no evidence of 
any difference in charitableness by gender:  Chi-square tests are very far from rejecting 
the null hypothesis that the distributions of judgments by male and female referees are the 
same.  Ignoring possible gender differences in the quality of papers that are assigned, the 
evidence in Table 3 is consistent with the view that the women judging others’ work were 
no more or less charitable than their male counterparts within any time period.
4 
Comparing responses across periods, however, suggests a slightly different 
implication.  While the rejection rate among males rose by 2.1 percentage points between 
the two periods, the rejection rate among female referees rose by 11.0 percentage points, 
a  double-difference of 8.9 percentage points (s.e. = 3.9).  The women who refereed in the 
late period were significantly less charitable than their male counterparts, as compared to 
the earlier period. 
This last comparison ignores the likelihood that the identity of the authors 
changed and the possibility that the female referees were assigned different kinds of 
papers in the two periods (which we saw was true along the dimension of gender 
matching).  To examine the charitableness issue further, and to test for gender-matched 
favoritism, Table 4 presents estimates of the equations (3’) describing refereeing 
decisions.  In light of the fact that there are very few recommendations of outright 
acceptance or even acceptance with minor revisions, we define the outcome as non-reject 
versus reject.  For both all-female and any-female papers, we interact the referee’s gender 
                                                 
4Referees’ views do matter:  All 13 papers rated “accept” by at least one referee and not below “accept with 
minor revision” by the other(s) were eventually published in the journal.  Also, there is substantial, but far 
from complete agreement on quality by referees.  For example, if one referee rated a paper at least “accept 
with minor revision,” 28 percent of the other referees (in two-referee cases) also rated it at least this highly.     8
with an indicator of the authors’ gender. Also, to account for the possible changing non-
observability of authors’ gender, and thus to provide estimates of α’,  β’ and λ’, we 
include interactions with an indicator for the judgment being made in the late period. 
We first estimate the equations using simple logit regressions, then using 
conditional logit regressions (conditional on the identity of the referee).  The conditional-
logit results limit variation in the outcome to differences in the interaction of a particular 
referee with authors of different gender, thus accounting for the referee-specific 
idiosyncrasies  ψj in (3’).  While we have no information on referees’ characteristics 
(other than gender), we include a quadratic in the number of previous times a person had 
refereed for the journal—a measure of experience. 
The results from both the logit and conditional-logit specifications in Table 4 
yield the same conclusions about the possibility of gender favoritism:  It is simply not 
evident in these data.  None of the difference-in-difference estimates (the “Difference” 
rows near the bottom of the table) is statistically significantly different from zero. The 
point estimates are also quite small, ranging from 0.1 percentage points to 4.4 percentage 
points for the logit specifications.  Even if referees in both periods could identify the 
gender of the authors of the papers they were assigned (so that Z=1 equally in both 
periods), our estimates for the separate sub-periods show that no 
favoritism/discrimination based on gender matching/non-matching was apparent.
5  
Moreover, the triple differences, the coefficients on the interaction term of female 
referees with female authors and the Late period (2000-2008), are all essentially zero. 
                                                 
5One additional possibility is that some of the control variables, particularly experience, are related to the 
impacts of the gender match and its effects in the separate sub-periods.  Interactions of referee experience 
with the referee-author match and its interaction with the sub-period identifier were essentially zero and 
had no effect on our conclusions about the possibility of favoritism. 
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The biggest change from the early (1986-1994) to the late (2000-2008) period 
appears in the author-gender effect upon male referees.  Male referees between 1986 and 
1994 were more likely to recommend rejection of female-authored papers (11.2 
percentage points more likely in the first column, with a 95-percent confidence interval of 
[4.1, 18.2]).  This difference disappears in the late period for the logit specifications.  The 
change does not necessarily reflect anything about gender favoritism, however, as an 
increase in the quality of female-authored papers could also explain the difference. 
One might thus argue that the relevant idiosyncrasies are manuscript- rather than 
referee-specific.
6  To examine this possibility, we re-estimated (3’) using logits 
conditional on manuscript identifiers (which causes any variable that does not vary across 
referees on the same manuscript to drop out of the equation).  Here again, the author-
referee gender interaction was insignificantly different from zero in both the early and 
late periods.  Finally, when we account for both referee and manuscript idiosyncrasies, 
we find no qualitative differences (although standard errors increase, as one would 
expect, with the increase in the number of fixed effects).
7 
These estimates do not account for the likelihood, as indicated by the across-
period comparisons in Table 3, that a change in the mix of referees altered observed 
behavior between periods.  Perhaps women who refereed during the early period were 
                                                 
6Clustering by manuscript or by referee has essentially no effect on the standard errors. 
 
7Another potentially confounding problem is a gender difference in self-selection.  Willingness to complete 
the assigned task may differ by gender, with women perhaps being more compliant (as they are in their 
propensity to complete surveys—Moore and Tarnai, 2002).  Differential selectivity will only bias the 
results if the propensity to complete the task is related to the charitableness of doers and refusers.  We 
cannot get at this problem, since we have no information on non-compliant referees.  If men are more likely 
not to comply, and non-compliers are nastier, then our results are biased in favor of finding that female 
referees are less charitable than males. A related difficulty may arise from the selection of referees by 
editors.  We cannot solve these problems completely; but the fact that the fraction female referees is 
slightly above the fraction female in the American Economic Association (Donald and Hamermesh, 2006) 
should allay some concerns about this issue.   10
inherently more favorable to female authors, but could not observe authors’ gender, while 
female referees who entered the refereeing pool during the late period discriminated 
against female authors.  This might have occurred because of the increase in female 
representation in the set of referees—possibly a reduced sense of solidarity among later 
cohorts of female economists. If this were correct, we would estimate λ’ = 0, even though 
the agents’ preferences exhibited favoritism in one case (the early referees) and 
discrimination in the other case (the new referees in the late period). 
To examine this possibility, we re-estimated the equations, restricting the sample 
to the 295 individuals who refereed in both the early and late periods.  The estimates for 
this reduced sample are presented in Table 5.  A comparison to the results in Table 4 
suggests that the apparent lack of favoritism or discrimination could not have resulted 
from the changing mix of referees.  Even within this sub-sample there is no evidence of a 
significant change in behavior toward female authors when the authors’ genders became 
more readily observable. The parameter estimates are quite similar across the two tables. 
IV. Conclusions and Implications 
Whereas many previous studies have found differences in altruism by gender, our 
examination of a unique and very large sample on author-referee outcomes in a high-
stakes field environment yields no evidence of gender differences.  Even accounting for 
the idiosyncrasies of both the judge and the judged, we still find no such differences. 
Moreover, we find no evidence of relative favoritism toward one’s own gender by either 
men or women.  
Female and male economists, at least in this specific setting, appear to behave 
similarly and in a gender-neutral manner.  This might be the result of some inherent sense   11
of fairness, with participants feeling that exercising their prejudices is inappropriate in 
this particular judging activity—that “there own identity is often tied to their self-concept 
as experts who are able to stand above their personal interest” (Lamont, 2009, p. 9).  
Moreover, given the absence of an interaction of experience with gender, our results 
suggest either that there is no self-selection by gender attitudes, or that fairness/non-
discrimination develops very early in the scholars’ professional careers. Combined with 
previous findings, our results suggest that gender differences in fairness and favoritism 
are context-specific.  Future research, including laboratory experiments, might examine 
how the extent of fairness/lack of favoritism depends on the perceived importance of the 
particular two-sided relationship.   12
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 Table 1. Author Characteristics, 1986-2008  (percentages) 
 
  1986-2008 1986-1994 2000-2008 
p-value for test 
of difference 
across periods 
All authors identified  80.7 69.7 87.3  <0.001 
       
All female authors, if all  16.9 15.6 18.5  0.104 
 authors identified       
       
Any female authors, if all 
authors identified  35.2 27.8 41.1  <0.001 
N =  2940 1116 1095   
   2
Table 2. Distribution of Female Referees, 1986-2008 
 
  1986-2008 1986-1994 2000-2008 
p-value for test 
of difference 
across periods 
Percent Female:  18.7 14.3 22.9  <0.001 
       
N  =  6133 2347 2173   
       
Assignment:       
       
Matched with all female  23.3  16.1  29.0   
 authors, if all authors identified         
       
Not matched with all female  18.3  14.2  21.8   
 authors, if all authors identified         
       
p-value (test of random matching)  0.001  0.445  0.004   
       
       
Matched with any female  21.8  15.9  25.2   
 authors, if all authors identified         
         
Not matched with any female  17.7  14.0  21.6   
 authors, if all authors identified         
       









 Female  Male  Female Male  Female  Male 
Reject  51.9 51.1  45.8  49.9  56.8  52.0 
            
Major  33.9 34.6  38.7  34.2  31.5  35.4 
            
Minor  13.1 13.1  13.7  14.4  10.9  11.3 
            
Accept  1.1 1.2  1.8  1.5  0.8  1.3 
            
 N =  1146 4987  336  2011  498  1675 
            
p-value (test of 
difference by gender)   0.92 0.41  0.25 




“Female Author” =  
All Female Authors 
“Female Author” =  
Any Female Authors    
  Logit Cond.  Logit Logit Cond.  Logit    
Year  0.0301 -0.0055 0.0294 -0.0060       
  (0.0126) (0.0251) (0.0126) (0.0251)     
          
Late  -0.4739 -0.4039 -0.4942 -0.4452     
  (0.1759) (0.2351) (0.1785) (0.2381)     
          
Experience  -0.0160 0.0875 -0.0147 0.0905     
  (0.0152) (0.0370) (0.0153) (0.0369)     
          
Experience Squared/100  0.0275 -0.2115 0.0227 -0.2202     
  (0.0651) (0.1051) (0.0652) (0.1050)     
          
Female Referee  0.1485  0.1077      
  (0.1264)  (0.1357)     
          
Female Referee*Late  -0.3907 -0.4342 -0.3896 -0.4301     
  (0.1710) (0.3134) (0.1909) (0.3285)    
          
Female Author  -0.4516 -0.5849 -0.1797 -0.3198     
   (0.1488) (0.1764) (0.1090) (0.1319)     
          
Female Author*Late  0.5126 0.6016 0.2995 0.4353     
   (0.2040) (0.2529) (0.1488) (0.1878)     
          
Female Author*  0.0329 0.2476 0.1771 0.0830     
 Female Referee   (0.3701) (0.4500) (0.2784) (0.3584)    
           
Female Author*   0.0311   0.1336  -0.0510   0.1157     
 Female Referee*Late  (0.4555) (0.5803) (0.3489) (0.4719)    
          
Pseudo-R
2  0.0049 0.0088 0.0041 0.0071     
          
N =   4520 3389 4520 3389       2
Table 4, continued 
 
          
Effect of female authorship on no-
reject probability, early period 
(1986-1994):          
         Female referees 
-0.104 
 [-0.268, 0.060] 
-0.084 
 [-0.281, 0.114] 
-0.001 
 [-0.125, 0.124] 
-0.059  
[-0.220, 0.102]     




 [-0.222, -0.063] 
-0.045 
 [-0.098, 0.008] 
-0.079 
 [-0.142, -0.016]     
         Difference 
0.007 
 [-0.171, 0.186] 
0.059 




[-0.153, 0.193]     
Effect of female authorship on no-
reject probability, late period 
(2000-2008):          
         Female referees 
0.031 
 [-0.079, 0.140] 
0.098 
 [-0.057, 0.254] 
0.031 
 [-0.070, 0.133] 
0.078 
 [-0.055, 0.211]     
         Male referees 
0.015 
 [-0.053,  0.084] 
0.004 
 [-0.085, 0.093] 
0.030 
 [-0.020, 0.080] 
0.029 
[-0.037, 0.094]     








 [-0.099, 0.197]     
*95% confidence intervals in brackets; standard errors in parentheses.Table 5. Logit and Conditional Logit Estimates of Effects on the Non-Reject Probability, Two-Period Referees, 
1986-1994, 2000-2008* 
 
  All Female Authors  Any Female Authors    




Logit    
Year  0.0026 0.0025 0.0027 0.0018     
  (0.0193) (0.0282) (0.0193) (0.0282)     
         
Late  -0.3234 -0.4552 -0.3296 -0.4975     
  (0.2412) (0.2747) (0.2445) (0.2787)     
         
Experience  0.0636 0.0771 0.0640 0.0804     
  (0.0250) (0.0404) (0.0249) (0.0404)     
         
Experience Squared/100  -0.2058 -0.1836 -0.2089 -0.1912     
  (0.0856) (0.1127) (0.0855) (0.1125)     
         
Female Referee  0.3291  0.3141      
  (0.1711)  (0.1836)     
         
Female Referee*Late  -0.7020 -0.3709 -0.7785 -0.5469     
  (0.2609) (0.32620 (0.2898) (0.3570)    
         
Female Author  -0.4412 -0.6111 -0.1637 -0.3108     
   (0.1951) (0.2222) (0.1493) (0.1687)     
         
Female Author*Late  0.5623 0.6079 0.2729 0.4316     
   (0.2860) (0.3246) (0.2082) (0.2384)     
         
Female Author*  -0.1481 0.1469 -0.0149  -0.0510     
 Female Referee   (0.4846) (0.5567) (0.3692) (0.4384)    
          
Female Author*   0.1691  -0.0676   0.2747   0.4815     
 Female Referee*Late  (0.6565) (0.7625) (0.5157) (0.6264)    
         
Pseudo-R
2  0.0078 0.0090 0.0065 0.0079     
         
N =   2277 2102 2277 2102     
*Standard errors in parentheses. 